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Abstract 
We examine intergenerational mobility in the very long run, across generations that are six 
centuries apart. We exploit a unique dataset containing detailed information at the individual 
level for all people living in the Italian city of Florence in 1427. These individuals have been 
associated, using their surnames, with their pseudo-descendants living in Florence in 2011. We 
find that earnings elasticity is about 0.04, much higher than predicted by traditional models of 
intergenerational mobility. We also find an even stronger role for real wealth inheritance and 
evidence of persistence in belonging to certain elite professions. Our results are confirmed when 
we account for the quality of the pseudo-links and when we address the potential selectivity bias 
due to the differential survival rates across surnames. We argue that the quasi-immobility of pre-
industrial society and the positional advantages in the access to certain professions might explain 
(in part) the long-lasting effects of ancestors’ socioeconomic status.    
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1. Introduction ♣ 
 
 “Prestige is an accident that affects human beings. It 
comes into being and decays inevitably. […] It reaches its 
end in a single family within four successive generations” 
Ibn Khaldun 
 
“Almost all the earnings advantages or disadvantages 
of ancestors are wiped out in three generations” 
Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes1 
 
Almost all of the theoretical and empirical studies on intergenerational 
mobility have focused on the correlation in socioeconomic status between two 
successive generations – parents and their children – and have shared a common 
view that the economic advantages and disadvantages of ancestors vanish in a few 
generations.2 In this paper, we question this view and empirically document the 
persistence of socioeconomic status across generations that are six centuries apart. 
This result is even more surprising: the huge political, demographic and economic 
upheavals that have occurred in the city across the centuries were not able to untie 
the Gordian knot of socioeconomic inheritance. 
Linking people belonging to generations that are distant from each other is 
difficult because of data limitations. In this paper, we exploit a unique dataset 
containing the main socioeconomic variables, at the individual level, for people 
living in the Italian city of Florence in 1427. These individuals (the ancestors) have 
been associated, using their surnames, to their pseudo-descendants living in 
Florence in 2011. Empirically, we use a two-sample two-stage least squares 
(TS2SLS) approach: first, we use the sample of ancestors and regress the log of 
♣ We thank Antonio Accetturo, Anthony Atkinson, Rosario Ballatore, Miles Corak, Domenico De 
Palo, Marta De Philippis, Paul Gregg, Andrea Ichino, Paolo Naticchioni, Paolo Sestito, the conference 
participants at AIEL, CIRET, SIE and SIEP and the seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, EUI, 
University of Ferrara, University of Florence and University of Trento for their useful comments; we 
also thank Giovanna Labartino, Peter Lindert and Giovanni Pica, who kindly shared data on the 
distribution of surnames across provinces, data on incomes in 1427 and estimates of 
intergenerational income mobility in Florence in 2005, respectively; we finally thank Riccardo 
Innocenti and Massimiliano Sifone of the municipal statistical office of Florence for providing us 
with tax records by surnames. The views expressed in this paper should be referred only to the 
authors and not to the institutions with which they are affiliated. 
1 Ibn Khaldun was one of the greatest Arab historians, and he is considered among the founding 
fathers of modern sociology, historiography and economics; the citation has been drawn from his 
influential book The Muqaddimah (1377). Becker and Tomes provided, in their seminal 
contributions, the theoretical framework that represented the main building block of research on 
intergenerational mobility; the citation was drawn from Becker and Tomes (1986). 
2 Earnings persistence has been observed in all countries studied so far, although to varying 
degrees. See Black and Devereux (2011) and Corak (2013) for recent surveys. Chetty et al. (2014) 
moved the analysis at the local level, providing evidence across commuting zones within the U.S. 
5 
 
                                                          
earnings on a full set of surname dummies (and, in some specifications, also on age 
and gender); second, we observe the current taxpayers present in the 2011 
Florence tax records and regress the log of their earnings on that of their 
ancestors, as predicted by the surname in the first step. The same strategy has 
been repeated using the log of real wealth or dummies for professions, instead of 
the log of earnings, as dependent variables.3 
We find that the elasticity of descendants’ earnings with respect to ancestors’ 
earnings is positive and statistically significant, with a point estimate around 0.04. 
Stated differently, being the descendants of the Bernardi family (at the 90th 
percentile of earnings distribution in 1427) instead of the Grasso family (10th 
percentile of the same distribution) would entail a 5% increase in earnings among 
current taxpayers. Intergenerational wealth elasticity is significant and equals 
about 0.02, though the magnitude of the implied effect is even larger: the 10th-90th 
exercise entails more than a 10% difference in real wealth today. Looking for non-
linearities, we find some evidence of the existence of a glass floor that protects the 
descendants of the upper class from falling down the economic ladder.  
These results suggest that the persistence of socioeconomic status in the long 
run is much higher than previously thought. In order to rationalize these findings, 
we provide two explanations. First, we show that intergenerational mobility in the 
15th century was much lower than at present: using the methodology recently 
proposed by Güell et al. (2015b), we estimate an intergenerational earnings 
elasticity (between two successive generations) between 0.8 and 0.9, thus 
depicting a quasi-immobile society in 1427. Second, we find evidence of dynasties 
in certain (elite) professions. This latter result is consistent with our baseline 
evidence on the long-run persistence of socioeconomic status. Moreover, it also 
highlights a potential channel of inheritance – related to the market and non-
market mechanisms governing access to certain professions – and it helps to 
explain why earnings elasticity does not necessarily decline geometrically, as 
commonly thought.  
Our empirical findings may suffer from two potential sources of bias. First, 
the strength of the pseudo-links may be questioned, as we work with generations 
that are six centuries apart. However, a rich set of robustness checks – including 
3 Björklund and Jäntti (1997) were the first to apply the TS2SLS approach to intergenerational 
mobility estimation. Thenceforth, the same strategy has been adopted for many country studies, 
typically using occupation, education and sector of activity to predict pseudo-fathers’ earnings. On 
the contrary, Aaronson and Mazumder (2008) used state and year of birth, while Olivetti and 
Paserman (2015) exploited the information conveyed by first names. Some of these variables, 
however, are partly endogenous, since they are related to parental characteristics, but they may 
also directly affect children’s outcomes (e.g. parents’ education or state of residence), thus leading 
to an upward bias. Surnames, in contrast, are markers that are more exogenous.  
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placebo regressions where we randomly reassign surnames to the descendants 
and regressions exploiting rare and Florence-specific surnames – is largely 
reassuring on the strength of the pseudo-links. If any, our estimated elasticity is 
downward biased. Second, family survival rates – and, therefore, the likelihood of 
finding descendants of Florentine families in the 15th century among current 
taxpayers – may vary across families. If the variation in the survival rate was 
correlated with current earnings and/or wealth, this would bias our estimates. To 
address this issue, we simulate earnings and wealth realizations for missed 
(unobserved) families, assuming that the economic outcomes of their descendants 
are independent from those of their ancestors (i.e. setting the intergenerational 
elasticity to the lower bound of zero) and rerun the baseline regressions. We also 
adopt a more standard Heckman approach, accounting for selectivity biases due to 
the survival rate. Both exercises qualitatively confirm our main findings.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide evidence on 
intergenerational mobility over the very long run, linking ancestors and 
descendants that are six centuries apart (i.e. about 20 generations of 30 years 
each). This is the main element of novelty in the paper. Linking people through 
more than one generation has rarely been done. In no other case has such a long 
time span been studied. Chan and Boliver (2013) showed a statistically significant 
association between grandparents’ and grandchildren’s class positions, even after 
parents’ class position is taken into account. Lindahl et al. (2015) used Swedish 
data that links individual earnings (and education) for three generations and found 
that persistence is much stronger across three generations than predicted from 
simple models for two generations. More similar to our paper, Collado et al. (2012) 
and Clark and Cummins (2014) exploited the distribution of surnames to estimate 
social mobility over the long run. Collado et al. (2012), using data from two 
Spanish regions, found that socioeconomic status at the end of the 20th century 
still depends on the socioeconomic status of one’s great-great grandparents; 
however, they also suggested that the correlation vanishes after five generations. 
Clark and Cummins (2014) used the distribution of rare surnames in England and 
found significant correlation between the wealth of families that are five 
generations apart.4 
Our empirical analysis also has other prominent strengths and elements of 
novelty. First, we consider different socioeconomic outcomes, including earnings, 
wealth and belonging to a profession. Indeed, most of the empirical evidence is 
4 In the data used by Clark and Cummins (2014), the wealth is estimated at death, thus ignoring 
inter-vivos transfers. Our data, on the contrary, have the advantage of being available when an 
individual is an adult. Moreover, we can control for the evolution of the outcome variable in the 
lifecycle by adding age among the controls. 
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focused on labor income, though wealth inheritance has recently attracted 
renewed interest (Piketty, 2011; Piketty and Zucman, 2015). Second, ancestors’ 
socioeconomic status has been predicted using surnames at the city level, thus 
generating more precise links across generations with respect to other studies that 
use names or surnames at the national level. Moreover, the huge heterogeneity and 
“localism” of Italian surnames further strengthen the quality of the pseudo-links 
and represent an ideal setting for analyses that exploit the informational content of 
surnames. Third, the Italian cities offer a unique background to trace family 
dynasties and investigate the transmission of inequalities across the centuries. In 
the 15th century, Florence, unanimously recognized as the cradle of the 
Renaissance, was already an advanced and complex society, characterized by a 
high level of economic development, a rich variety of professions and significant 
occupational stratification. Today, Florence continues to display the same features, 
and it can be considered as a representative city of an advanced country. Hence, 
our results are, in principle, generalizable to other prosperous and developed 
societies. Fourth, we are the first to provide a measure of (two-generation) 
intergenerational earnings mobility in a pre-industrial society. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
empirical strategy. Section 3 provides background information and describes the 
data and the variables. Section 4 shows the main empirical results, while Section 5 
examines potential biases due to the quality of the pseudo-links and to selectivity 
issues, and other robustness issues. Section 6 suggests some mechanisms behind 
long run persistence. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Empirical strategy 
 
The main requirement when analyzing socioeconomic mobility is an 
appropriate data set that spans over generations. Unfortunately, such a suitable 
dataset is not easily available, and this is even more true if we consider generations 
that are centuries apart. To overcome the problem, we adopt an approach that 
combines information from two separate samples (TS2SLS) and whose properties 
are discussed in Inoue and Solon (2010). 
In the first sample, we have information about ancestors’ socioeconomic 
outcomes (e.g. log of earnings), their surnames and some other covariates, and we 
run the following regression: 
 




where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the outcome of individual 𝑖𝑖 living in Florence in the 15th century, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 is a 
vector of controls, including age, age squared and gender, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 is a set of dummies 
for each surname, and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 is the error term. 
In the second sample, we have information about pseudo-descendants, i.e. 
taxpayers currently living in Florence. For reasons of data availability, the data are 
aggregated at the surname level. The regression of interest is: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽�𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑� + 𝜌𝜌𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 + 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑  (2) 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑  is the average outcome of individuals with surname 𝑘𝑘 currently living in 
Florence, 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑  is, as above, a vector of controls for (average) age, age squared and 
gender, 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 is the log of ancestors’ outcomes, imputed using surnames and the 
surname coefficients estimated in equation (1), and 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 is the residual; the 
parameter 𝛽𝛽 is the TS2SLS estimate of the intergenerational elasticity. To replicate 
the original population, the regressions are weighted by the frequency of the 
surnames. The standard errors have been bootstrapped with 1,000 replications in 
order to take into account the fact that the key regressor is generated. 
In the second part of the paper, we complement the evidence on the long run 
elasticities with an empirical exercise aimed at testing the persistence in belonging 
to the following professions: lawyers, bankers, medical doctors and pharmacists, 
and goldsmiths. We restrict the analysis to them because they are affluent 
professions already existing in 1427 and for which data are currently publicly 
available (see more on that in Section 6.2). By merging information drawn from 
the surname distribution in the province of Florence with the public registers 
containing the surnames of the above mentioned professions, we built a dataset at 
the individual level where, for each taxpayer, we are able to define a dummy 
variable indicating whether she belongs or not to a given profession. Finally, for 
each profession, we regress this dummy variable on the share of ancestors in the 
same profession. Namely, for each profession 𝑝𝑝 (𝑝𝑝 = lawyers, bankers, medical 
doctors and pharmacists, and goldsmiths), we estimate a probit model whose 
estimating equation reads as: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 1� = Φ� 𝛾𝛾𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖� (3) 
 
where 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if individual 𝑖𝑖 with surname 𝑘𝑘 
belongs to profession 𝑝𝑝 in 2005 and 0 otherwise, 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is the share of ancestors with 
surname 𝑘𝑘 belonging to profession 𝑝𝑝 and Φ(. ) is the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution. Since the estimation combines 
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individual-level data for the dependent variable and aggregate, surname-level data 
for the covariate, the standard errors are clustered at the surname level (Moulton, 
1990).  
 
3. Data and descriptive analysis 
 
3.1  Data sources 
 
Florence originated as a Roman city, and later, after a long period as a 
flourishing medieval trading and banking commune, it was the birthplace of the 
Italian Renaissance. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, it was politically, 
economically and culturally one of the most important cities in the world from the 
14th to 16th centuries.5 In 1427, in the midst of a fiscal crisis provoked by the 
protracted wars with Milan, the Priors of the Republic decreed an entirely new tax 
survey that applied to the citizens of Florence and to the inhabitants of the 
Florentine districts (1427 Census, henceforth). The assessments were entrusted to 
a commission of ten officials and their staff, and were largely complete within a 
few months, although revisions continued during 1428 and 1429. It has been 
acknowledged as one of the most comprehensive tax surveys to be conducted in 
pre-modern Western Europe. The documentary sources are fully described in 
Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber (1985).  
The 1427 Census represents our first sample, containing information on the 
socioeconomic status of the ancestors. Indeed, the dataset reports, for each 
household, among other variables, the name and the surname of the head of the 
household, occupation at a 2-digit level, assets (i.e. value of real property and of 
private and public investments), age and gender. The data were enriched with 
estimates of the earnings attributed to each person on the basis of the occupations 
and the associated skill group.6 
The Florence 2011 tax records represent our second sample, containing 
information on the socioeconomic status of the pseudo-descendants. From the tax 
records, we draw information on incomes and the main demographic 
characteristics (age and gender). The income items reported on personal tax 
returns include salaries and pensions, self-employment income, real estate income, 
and other smaller income items. In order to comply with the privacy protection 
5 The Medici, the most renowned rulers, gathered to court the best artists, writers and scientists of 
the time, such as Botticelli, Dante, Galileo, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo and Machiavelli. 
6 The data on earnings were kindly provided by Peter Lindert (University of Davis). See the 
document gpih.ucdavis.edu/files/BLW/Tuscany_1427.doc for further information. The same data 
were also used in Milanovic et al. (2011) for an analysis on inequality in the pre-industrial societies. 
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rules, the variables have been collapsed at the surname level, and only surnames 
with a frequency equal to 5 or above have been included. We define as earnings the 
total income net of real estate income, while real wealth has been estimated from 
real estate income.7 
Examining the persistence across centuries in certain professions, as in 
equation (3), requires additional datasets, because the tax records do not contain 
information on professions. We proceeded as follows. First, we have individual 
level data on the universe of taxpayers in the province of Florence in 2005, for 
which we observed only surnames, drawn from the Italian Internal Revenue 
Service. Second, we merged this dataset with the public registers containing the 
surnames of lawyers, bankers, medical doctors and pharmacists, and goldsmiths. 
For example, suppose that there are 𝑛𝑛 taxpayers with a certain surname and that 
we know that there are 𝑝𝑝1 lawyers and 𝑝𝑝2 bankers with the same surname. We 
assumed, without loss of generality, that the first 𝑝𝑝1 individuals are lawyers and 
the second 𝑝𝑝2 are bankers (obviously, with ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 < 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ). The public archives for these 
professions are the following: bankers are taken from the ORgani SOciali ORSO 
archive, which is managed by the Bank of Italy and contains registry information 
on the members of the governing bodies of banks (we restrict the analysis to 
Tuscan banks, as Tuscany is the Italian region where Florence is located); lawyers, 
doctors and pharmacists came from the archives of the local professional orders; 
finally, the National Business Register database contains registry information on 
the members of the governing bodies of goldsmith firms and shops (again, we 
focused on surnames in the Florence area).  
 
3.2  The origin and distribution of surnames 
 
Pseudo-links between ancestors and their descendants are generated using 
(implicitly) geographical localization – since we consider people living in Florence 
in both samples – and exploiting the informational content of surnames. 
Italians surnames have some interesting peculiarities. They are inherited 
from one generation to the next through the patriline, and most Italians began to 
assume hereditary surnames in the 15th century. Some surnames derived from 
one’s father’s names (patronymics) through the use of the Latin genitive (e.g. 
7 Specifically, from the biannual Survey of Household Income and Wealth carried out by the Bank of 
Italy (we used the waves from 2000 to 2012), we selected people living in the province of Florence, 
we regressed the log of real assets on age, gender and incomes from the building (actual and 
imputed rents), and we stored the coefficients. Then, we imputed real wealth for the individuals 




                                                          
Mattei means son of Matteo)8 or formed by the preposition of “di”/“de” followed 
by the name (e.g. Di Matteo or De Matteo meaning the son of Matteo). The origin or 
residence of the family gave rise to many surnames such as the habitat – Della 
Valle (i.e. “of the valley”) – specific places – Romano (i.e. “Roman”) – or nearby 
landmarks – Piazza (i.e. “square”). The occupations (or utensils associated with the 
occupation) were also a widespread source of surnames, such as Medici (“medical 
doctors”), Martelli (“hammer”) or Forni (“ovens”). Finally, nicknames, typically 
referring to physical attributes, also gave rise to some family names, e.g. Basso 
(“short”) or Grasso (“fat”). The huge variety of surnames was amplified by the 
extraordinary linguistic diversity of Italy. Many surnames’ endings are region-
specific, such as “-n” in Veneto (e.g. Benetton), “-iello” in Campania (e.g. Borriello), 
“-u” or “-s” in Sardinia (e.g. Soru and Marras) and “-ai” or “-ucci” in Tuscany (e.g. 
Bollai and Balducci).  
To our aim, the context we analyzed has two striking features. First, in Italy, 
there are a large number of surnames, likely one of the largest collections of 
surnames of any ethnicity in the world. This is associated with a high 
fractionalization: for example, the first 100 most frequent surnames only account 
for 7% of the overall population, against 22% in England. Second, and 
unsurprisingly, the surnames present in our data are highly Florence-specific: on 
average, the ratio between the surname share in Florence and the corresponding 
figure at the national level, which measures a specialization index centered on 1, is 
nearly 6. Therefore, the informational content of the surname is presumably much 
higher than elsewhere, supporting our empirical strategy in the identification of 
the pseudo-links.  
The creation of the pseudo-links between the two samples through surnames 
has been pursued with some necessary degree of flexibility to account for slight 
modifications in the surnames across the centuries. For example, current 
taxpayers with surnames such as “Mattei”, “De Matteo” or “Di Matteo” are all 
considered descendants of “Matteo”. 
 
3.3  Descriptive analysis 
 
In the 1427 Census, there are about 10,000 families (1,900 surnames), 
corresponding to nearly 40,000 individuals. The descriptive statistics reported in 
Table 1 refer to household heads. The earnings and real wealth were equal, on 
average, to 36 and 291 florins, respectively. Moreover, the two variables were 
8 The large number of Italian surnames ending in “-i” is also due to the medieval habit of identifying 
families by the name of the ancestors in the plural (which have an “-i” suffix in Italian). 
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characterized by an unequal distribution across the families: the Gini index was 
nearly 40% for earnings and about 65% for real wealth. Members of the guilds 
were at the top of the economic ladder and held influential positions in society and 
politics. The most powerful guilds were those involved in the manufacture or trade 
of wool and silk, and money changers. Indeed, many Florentine families were 
successful bankers (e.g. Bardi, Medici and Peruzzi), and they were known 
throughout Europe as well, for they established banking houses in other important 
cities such as London, Geneva and Bruges. 
Figure 1a groups the occupations, providing a complete picture of 
occupational diversity and stratification. More than two fifths were artisans, such 
as those who combed, carded and sorted wool, or carpenters. Entrepreneurs and 
members of guilds, in turn, represented nearly one fifth of the workers. The 
vibrant economic activity favored the development of lettered bureaucrats and 
professionals (nearly one tenth of the workers) such as lawyers, judges, medical 
doctors and pharmacists (the oldest pharmacy in Europe was set up in Florence). 
Other significant occupational groups were those of merchants and of government 
servants (e.g. firemen, town criers and soldiers). At the bottom of the occupational 
ladder, there were unskilled workers, such as people beating, cleaning and 
washing the raw wool, urban laborers and the servants of private families. When 
mapping occupations into sectors of activity (Figure 1b), nearly half of the sample 
was employed in manufacturing (mainly makers of wool and leather products). 
Other important sectors were trade, food and wine, and public services. The 
agriculture share, in contrast, was very small, because the data do not include the 
countryside, which is where the agricultural activity was concentrated.  
For slightly less than half of the surnames listed in the 1427 Census, we found 
pseudo-descendants in the 2011 tax records. They correspond to about 800 
surnames and 52,000 taxpayers. On average, they earn about 24,000 Euros per 
year, and the real wealth is estimated to be larger than 160,000 Euros (Table 1). 
Table 1 also shows that the professions under scrutiny are niche professions, both 
in 1427 and in the 2000s: they account for a very small share of the workers.  
Table 2 combines the tax records from 1427 and 2011 through surnames and 
provides a first explorative assessment of persistence: we report for the top 5 and 
bottom 5 earners among current taxpayers (at the surname level), the modal value 
of the occupation and the percentiles in the earnings and wealth distribution in the 
15th century (the surnames are replaced by capital letters for confidentiality 
reasons). The top earners among the current taxpayers were already at the top of 
the socioeconomic ladder 6 centuries ago: they were lawyers or members of the 
wool, silk and shoemaker guilds; their earnings and wealth were always above the 
13 
 
median. On the contrary, the poorest surnames had less prestigious occupations, 
and their earnings and wealth were below the median in most cases. 
 
4. Main results 
 
As shown in equation (1), in the first stage, we regress the log of the 
ancestors’ earnings or the log of the ancestors’ real wealth on the surname 
dummies (and, in some specifications, the controls included in the vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎) using 
the 1427 Census data. We find that the surnames account for about 10% of the 
total variation in the log of earnings and 17% of the total variation in the log of 
wealth. These results support the hypothesis that the surnames carry information 
about socioeconomic status. The coefficients for the surnames estimated in the 
first stage are then used to predict the ancestors’ earnings and real wealth for the 
taxpayers included in the 2011 tax records. 
Table 3 presents our TS2SLS estimates of the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity, as shown in equation (2). We consider three different empirical 
specifications, with the first including only the predicted ancestors’ earnings, the 
second and the third adding gender, and gender, age and its square, respectively. 
The controls in the first stage regressions are adjusted accordingly. The earnings 
elasticity is fairly stable across specification, with a magnitude around 0.04, and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 3 also reports the standardized beta 
coefficient and the rank-rank coefficient. According to the former, a one standard 
deviation increase in the pseudo ancestors’ log earnings increases the pseudo 
descendants’ log earnings by 6% of its standard deviation. The effect, besides being 
positive and significant, is also non-negligible from an economic point of view. Put 
differently, being the descendants of a family at the 90th percentile of earnings 
distribution in 1427, instead of a family at the 10th percentile of the same 
distribution, would entail a 5% increase in earnings among the current taxpayers.  
Table 4 replicates the estimation with respect to the real wealth elasticity. 
The parameter ranges from 0.02 to 0.03, and it is, again, highly significant. The 
standardized beta coefficient equals 7% and is slightly larger than in the earnings 
case. Stronger wealth persistence, with respect to earnings, is confirmed by the 
results of the rank-rank regression (and similar findings are obtained, even if we 
restrict the estimation to the same sample of families). The 10th-90th exercise 
entails a 12% difference in real wealth today. The larger inertia in the real wealth 
case is somewhat expected, as real wealth is accumulated through income (net of 
consumption) over the life-cycle, but can also be directly passed down to 
subsequent generations through bequests or inter-vivos transfers. 
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Intergenerational elasticities are useful summary measures, but they may 
conceal interesting details about intergenerational mobility at different points of 
the distribution. Researchers have used different techniques to relax the linearity 
assumption, including spline, higher-order terms or quantile regressions. 
Unfortunately, the sample size at our disposal prevents us from applying these 
techniques, and we rely on more traditional and simpler transition matrices, 
dividing ancestors’ and descendants’ economic outcomes into three classes, 
according to terciles (lower, middle and upper classes). In Table 5, we report the 
transition matrix referred to earnings. For those originating from the lower class, 
there are fairly similar opportunities to belong to one of the three destination 
classes. For those coming from the upper class, in contrast, the probability of 
falling down to the bottom of the economic ladder is relatively low. A similar “glass 
floor” is observed for the wealth transition matrix (Table 6); moreover, in this case, 
we also observe a “sticky floor”: more than two fifths of descendants from the 
lower class remain there after centuries. 
The results in Tables 3-6 suggest that the persistence of socioeconomic status 
in the long run is much higher than previously thought. They are even more 
striking given the huge political, demographic and economic upheavals that have 
occurred in the city across the centuries. On the political ground, Florence has 
passed from the capital city of a small city-state (see Figure 2) to a city within a 
larger State (with the Italian unification in 1861), whose capital city is located 
elsewhere. Regarding demography, the population was fairly stable between 1400 
and 1800 and experienced a huge increase in the 19th and 20th centuries (see 
Figure 3a). Finally, the GDP per capita was basically flat in the pre-industrial era, 
while it recorded an exceptionally high growth rate during the 20th century (see 
Figure 3b), accompanied by the industrial revolution, the tertiarization, and finally, 
the technological revolution. 
One might wonder whether these results can be generalized to other 
societies. According to the evidence at our disposable, we argue that they can be 
thoughtfully extended to other advanced countries, presumably in Western 
Europe, that share a similar long run development pattern with Florence. Indeed, 
Milanovic et al. (2011) showed that the gross domestic income per capita and the 
Gini index in Florence in 1427 were comparable to those of other pre-industrial 
societies for which we have data, such as England, Wales and Holland. Looking at 
more recent evidence, according to the Eurostat data, in 2013, the purchasing 
power standard GDP per inhabitant in Tuscany was just slightly above the EU28 
average. Moreover, Güell et al. (2015a) provided evidence on the degree of 
intergenerational mobility for all Italian provinces (the data are referred to 2005); 
according to their evidence, the (simulated) intergenerational income elasticity for 
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the province of Florence would be between 0.4 and 0.5, a figure that is slightly 
lower than that of Italy as a whole and broadly comparable with that of other 
advanced countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France 
(Corak, 2013).9 In sum, Florence does not seem to be a polar case in terms of 




5.1  Imputation procedures and outliers 
 
Table 7 provides a first set of robustness checks. First, we address the 
imputation procedures. As far as earnings are concerned, the tax records, as is well 
known, may suffer from a severe underestimation due to tax evasion. In the first 
columns, we upwardly revise the variables from the tax records with the 
correction factors suggested by Marino and Zizza (2011).10 The results are 
unchanged, and this may be explained by the fact that tax evasion is not correlated 
with the pseudo-ancestors’ earnings. As far as wealth is concerned, this variable is 
not directly observed in the 2011 tax records and has been obtained through an 
imputation process based on the real estate income. In the third column, we 
directly regress the real estate income on the ancestors’ wealth in order to avoid 
our results from being driven by our imputation procedure. The results are 
basically unchanged.  
Second, we address the sensitivity to outliers, as the distributions of earnings 
and wealth have long tails that might drive the results. In the second and fourth 
columns, we trim both the dependent variable and the key regressor at the 1% and 
the 99% levels, and we re-estimated equation (2): again, the estimates of positive 
and significant intergenerational elasticities are fully confirmed. 
 
5.2  Robustness of pseudo-links 
 
Our empirical strategy relies on the assumption that the probability that one 
9 Güell et al. (2015a) do not estimate intergenerational elasticity, but the Informative Content of 
Surname (ICS) indicator that is monotonically related to the intergenerational elasticity. The 
reported figures have been obtained by mapping the ICS values into elasticities using Figure 2 in 
Güell et al. (2015b). See also Section 6.1 below.  
10 Marino and Zizza (2011) compared incomes from tax records with those collected through the 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth. This approach is based on the hypothesis that, as the 
survey questionnaire is multipurpose and replying is not compulsory, it is likely that respondents 
do not feel threatened or suspicious and would hence reply truthfully. On this basis, they provided, 
for each income type, a proxy of tax evasion (as measured by the difference between the income 
from the survey and the income from the fiscal source). 
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taxpayer (randomly) taken from the 2011 tax record is a descendant of one 
taxpayer (randomly) selected from the 1427 Census is strictly higher if the two 
share the same surname. Two facts challenge our working hypothesis. First, people 
sharing the same surname may well not belong to the same family. Second, the city 
of Florence is not a closed system. For instance, it may well happen that an 
immigrant, having the same surname as those living in Florence in 1427, settled in 
Florence from outside in the following centuries. Our methodology erroneously 
treats the latter as a pseudo-descendant of the former. 
We start by noting that our pseudo-links are more reliable with respect to 
those adopted in previous studies, as they are generated by surnames living in the 
city of Florence. For example, if the same data were available for all Italian cities, 
our strategy would entail the prediction of the ancestors’ socioeconomic status 
using the interaction between surnames and cities. This is arguably a more 
demanding and more precise approach to creating links across generations than 
the one adopted in previous studies (i.e. surnames at the national level). Moreover, 
the huge heterogeneity and “localism” of Italian surnames further strengthens the 
quality of the pseudo-links. 
Nevertheless, we propose three tests aimed at showing the robustness of our 
findings to the lineage imputation procedure. The first test is based on the idea 
that the more common a surname is, the less sharing the surname is likely to be 
informative about actual kinship. In the first two columns of Table 8, we re-
estimate equation (3) by weighting observations with the inverse of the relative 
frequency in 1427, thus giving more weight to rare surnames. Our results are 
confirmed, and if anything, they are upwardly revised, consistent with the fact that 
the mismeasurement of the family links should lead to an attenuation bias.  
The second test exploits the extent to which a surname is Florence-specific 
(specificity is measured as the ratio between the surname shared in Florence and 
the corresponding figure at the national level): the idea is that the more a surname 
is Florence-specific, the less the same surname is likely to be contaminated by in- 
and out-migration patterns. In the last two columns of Table 8, we split our key 
parameters by interacting them with a dummy variable that equals 1 for more 
typical Florentine surnames (those with a value of the ratio above the median) and 
0 otherwise. The results are reassuring: the elasticities are larger (and significant) 
for more Florence-specific surnames.  
The two exercises discussed above indirectly test the robustness of the 
pseudo-links. We complement them with a direct test that goes as follows. We 
randomly reassigned surnames to taxpayers in 2011 and re-estimated the TS2SLS 
intergenerational elasticities. If the positive correlations we detected were not 
related to the lineage (whose measurement might be affected by error), but would 
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emerge by chance, we should find that our estimates are not statistically different 
from those stemming from a random reshuffling of surnames. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of the estimated earnings elasticity for 1 million replications. The two 
dashed vertical lines are the 95th and the 99th percentiles, while the red line 
indicates our estimate based on the observed surnames. These results provide a 
clear graphical representation of the informational content of the surnames and 
the goodness of the pseudo-links: the simulated p-value in this exercise is lower 
than 1%. Figure 5 shows the corresponding results for wealth, where the result of 
the test is even more telling. 
 
5.3  Selectivity bias due to families’ survival rate 
 
As said above, we are able to match only a subsample of the surnames in the 
1427 Census with the 2011 tax records. This is clearly a reflection of the 
demographic processes that are involved in the analysis of intergenerational 
mobility in the very long run: the families’ survival rate depends on migration, 
reproduction, fertility and mortality, which, in turn, may differ across people with 
different socioeconomic backgrounds.  
As far as migration is concerned, some of the families recorded in the 1427 
Census might have decided to migrate during the following centuries. Since they 
are not necessarily a random sample of the original population, this might bias our 
estimates. Borjas (1987) provided a theoretical model that shows that migrants 
are mainly drawn from the upper or lower tail of the skill (i.e. income) distribution. 
Analogously, a dynasty’s reproduction rate (i.e. fertility/mortality rate) may be 
correlated with income and/or wealth. Jones et al. (2010) showed a strong and 
robust negative relationship between income and fertility, though they also argued 
that, in the agrarian (pre-industrialization) economies, the reverse could have 
been possible, as documented, for example, in Clark and Cummins (2009). On the 
other side, it is reasonable to expect that the wealthiest families were those better 
equipped to survive across the centuries (and therefore, those that can be matched 
to the current tax records).  
How do we address these issues? First, we compare the distributions of 
earnings and wealth in 1427 between the families who are still present in the tax 
records of 2011 and those who are not in order to have a general assessment of the 
relevance of the selection issue. Figure 6a shows that the distributions of earnings 
are rather similar, although the density of missing families has a larger mass of 
probability for the lower level of earnings. As far as wealth is concerned, the two 
distributions overlap each other (Figure 6b). Table 9 confirms the visual 
inspection: with respect to the missing families, the surviving ones had 6% higher 
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earnings, while the difference in the real wealth is not significant from a statistical 
point of view. Overall, these differences do not seem huge, and therefore, the 
selection concerns are somewhat downsized. 
Nevertheless, in the following, we propose two tests aimed at addressing the 
selectivity bias. The first is aimed at fixing a lower bound for our estimates with 
respect to the potential selectivity bias induced by selective migration. The test 
goes as follows. Since the elasticity is usually bounded between 0 and 1, we assume 
that for missing families, the elasticity is 0, meaning that the migrated families 
were able to cut the Gordian knot of socioeconomic inheritance. Note that this is 
the most unfavorable assumption we can make; moreover, this working hypothesis 
is also not very plausible, because the available evidence also shows a significant 
socioeconomic persistence across generations among immigrants.11 We add these 
missing families to the estimating sample, and having assumed that the elasticity is 
null, impute their earnings/real wealth in 2011 by randomly drawing from a 
lognormal distribution whose moments are taken from the corresponding 
distribution of the surviving families. Then, we regress equation (2) on the 
augmented sample and repeat this procedure (drawing and regression) 1 million 
times. The parameters of interest are still significant from a statistical and 
economic point of view: the average estimated elasticity equals 0.016* (with 
standard deviation equal to 0.009) in the earnings case and 0.010*** (with 
standard deviation equal to 0.004) for real wealth. These parameters represent a 
lower bound to intergenerational elasticity estimates, as far as selection is 
concerned. 
Second, we adopt a more traditional two-stage Heckman correction. In the 
first stage, we exploit further information recorded in the 1427 Census. Namely, 
we estimate a probit model with the survival rate as a function of the family size; 
the latter should have a direct (and mechanical) positive effect on the survival rate. 
The identifying assumption is that this variable observed in 1427 does not have a 
direct effect on earnings and wealth in 2011. Like any exclusion restrictions, this 
assumption cannot be directly tested. However, the correlation between family 
size and earnings and wealth in 1427 was close to zero and not statistically 
significant, thus reassuring us on its exogeneity in the two-step Heckman 
procedure. Table 10 shows that a larger family size positively influences the 
survival rate and enters with the expected signs. In the second stage, the selectivity 
term is statistically significant only for wealth elasticity, and more importantly, the 
11 Borjas (1993) showed that the earnings of second-generation Americans are strongly affected by 
the economic conditions of their parents in their source countries. According to Card (2005), the 
intergenerational transmission of education is about the same for families of immigrants as for 
other families in the US. 
19 
 
                                                          
coefficients of interest are very close to the baseline results, and if anything, they 
are slightly upwardly revised.  
 
6. Discussion of long-run persistence 
 
Intergenerational mobility scholars typically presume that correlations 
across generations decline geometrically (i.e. the correlation between grandparent 
and child is the square of the parent–child correlation, the correlation between 
great-grandparent and child is the cube, etc.). If this were true, our estimates, 
which are referred to about 20 generations, would be not consistent with the 
prevailing estimates on earnings mobility.12 Some recent papers have questioned 
the assumption that the intergenerational transmission process of human capital 
has a memory of only one period. Indeed, for example, grandparents can directly 
transmit their cultural capital to their grandchildren through childrearing or other 
forms of interactions. Similarly, they can directly pass their wealth to their 
grandchildren. However, even the two-period memory hypothesis is not enough, 
by itself, to fully explain our findings. 
A deep and exhaustive insight into the underlying mechanisms of long-run 
persistence is beyond the scope of the paper (and probably represents a promising 
area for future works). However, in the following, we discuss two explanations and 
provide the related empirical evidence for the observed persistence across the 
centuries. 
 
6.1  Intergenerational mobility in the 15th century 
 
An earnings elasticity (between two successive generations) close to 1 in the 
pre-industrial era may help to explain why we still find some degree of inheritance 
of socioeconomic status after six centuries. Indeed, in the pre-industrial era, the 
persistence in social standing across the generations has been perceived as large, 
while some scholars tend to believe that industrialization and the rise of capitalism 
have brought a more fluid society.13  
In order to provide some empirical support to this claim, we rely on the 
approach by Güell et al. (2015b), who developed a novel measure of 
12 In Italy, according to Mocetti (2007), the intergenerational earnings elasticity is equal to 0.5; 
Güell et al. (2015a) provided an estimate for the province of Florence in the interval between 0.4 
and 0.5, slightly less than that for Italy as a whole. 
13 See Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Piketty (2000) for a discussion of liberal and Marxist 
theory about the degree of intergenerational mobility in the industrial society. See Clark (2014) for 
an interesting picture of social mobility in various societies (and in various historical periods). 
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intergenerational mobility that needs only cross-sectional data and is based on the 
informational content of surnames (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝛿𝛿). Specifically, the 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝛿𝛿 is defined as 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝛿𝛿 ≡ 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷2 − 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹2. The first term (𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷2) is obtained from the regression 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠 = 𝑏𝑏′𝐷𝐷 +
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠 is the log of the income of individual 𝑖𝑖 with the surname 𝑟𝑟 and 
𝐷𝐷 is an S-vector of the surname-dummy variables with 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 = 1 if individual 𝑖𝑖 has 
the surname 𝑟𝑟 and 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 = 0 otherwise. The second term (𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹2) is obtained from the 
regression 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠 = 𝑏𝑏′𝐹𝐹 + 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 where 𝐹𝐹 is an S-vector of “fake” dummy variables 
that randomly assign surnames to individuals in a manner that maintains the 
marginal distribution of surnames. The authors showed that the ICS is a 
monotonically increasing function of the (more conventional) intergenerational 
earnings elasticity and draws such a function for some baseline parameters.  
Following this methodology, we estimate that earnings elasticity in the 15th 
century was between 0.8 and 0.9, thus depicting a quasi-immobile society. Then, 
we compare these figures with those drawn from Güell et al. (2015a) for the 
province of Florence in 2005 and analogously mapped into elasticity. These 
findings are shown in Figure 7. Though they should be interpreted with some 
caution, given the different nature of the data sources, they support the view that, 
in the past, intergenerational mobility was (much) lower than it is today.  
If one assumes that elasticities close to 1 were prevailing until the 20th 
century – i.e. before the effects of the industrial revolution were fully deployed in 
Italy and before mass schooling – then one would obtain a long-run earnings 
elasticity across six centuries that is comparable to ours. 
 
6.2  Dynasties in elite professions 
 
Our last empirical evidence concerns the existence of some degree of 
persistence in certain (elite) professions. On the one hand, this represents a 
further perspective (beyond earnings and wealth) on intergenerational mobility. 
On the other hand, this evidence can provide some insight on the channels behind 
intergenerational mobility processes.  
Many social institutions contribute to status inheritance over multiple 
generations, especially at the bottom (e.g. due to ethnic or social discrimination) 
and at the top (e.g. membership of exclusive clubs and/or elite professions) of 
hierarchies. In a society of perfect status inheritance (e.g. a pure caste system), the 
children, parents, grandparents, and earlier ancestors are identical in their social 
and economic positions; in this society, the perfect correlations between each 
generation make alternative types of intergenerational effects (e.g. children-
parents, children-grandparents, etc.) indistinguishable. Zylberberg (2014) 
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underlined the existence of unobservable variables that are transmitted by 
parents: The sons of successful families may preserve the high prospects for their 
descendants, even when their own earnings are not very high. In his theoretical 
framework, dynasties move across careers, rather than across income levels, and a 
society can be modelled as a Markov process in which the transition matrix is 
block-diagonal: only within-block mobility is allowed (e.g. the block of manual jobs 
vs. the block of cognitive jobs). This is consistent with an earnings elasticity that 
does not decline geometrically and with a society characterized by some form of 
dynastic transmission of professions. 
On the empirical side, we examine whether one’s probability of being 
employed in a certain elite profession today is higher, the more one’s pseudo-
ancestors were employed in the same profession. Namely, we selected the 
professions of lawyers, bankers, medical doctors and pharmacists, and goldsmiths. 
We consider only these professions for several reasons. First, because of data 
availability, we are forced to focus on professions that already existed in 1427 and 
for which we currently have access to publicly available data. Second, they should 
be elite or niche professions, consistent with the fact that there should be 
unobservable variables that favored career following (e.g. specific human capital 
or guild privileges). As shown in Figure 8, the earnings in the selected professions 
are larger than the average, both in 1427 and today. Third, the available empirical 
evidence documents the existence of career dynasties precisely for (some of) these 
professions.14 
The results from the estimation of equation (3) are reported in Table 11. In 
each column, we consider each profession separately, and we find a positive and 
statistically significant correlation for lawyers, bankers and goldsmiths, and a 
positive, but not significant, correlation for doctors and pharmacists. The 
magnitude of the impact is clearly small. A one-standard deviation increase in the 
independent variable increases the dependent variable by 0.5%, 0.2% and 0.6% of 
its standard deviation for lawyers, bankers and goldsmiths, respectively. 
Nevertheless, these results are, again, surprisingly high and strong if evaluated 
across six centuries. Moreover, these results are consistent with earnings 
persistence, and in particular, with larger persistence at the top of the earnings 
distribution.  
 
14 See Lentz and Laband (1989) for doctors, Laband and Lentz (1992) for lawyers and Mocetti 
(2016) for pharmacists.  
22 
 
                                                          
7. Conclusions 
 
We have examined intergenerational mobility in the very long run, using a 
unique dataset that combines the tax records from the Italian city of Florence in 
1427 and in 2011, and exploiting a favorable setting for this kind of analysis.  
We have found that earnings elasticity, across generations that are six 
centuries apart, is positive and statistically significant. Its point estimate is about 
0.04, much higher than that predicted by traditional models of intergenerational 
mobility. We also find evidence of an even stronger real wealth inheritance and of 
persistence in certain elite professions. Simple descriptive analysis from transition 
matrices also indicates the existence of a glass floor that protects descendants of 
the upper class from falling down the economic ladder. Our findings on elasticities 
are robust to a number of sensitivity checks, particularly to the lineage imputation 
and to the potential selectivity bias due to the heterogeneous survival rates across 
families.  
We also provide two tentative explanations (and the related empirical 
support) for the surprisingly low level of mobility: first, mobility in the past was 
much lower than it is today; second, social status and other unobservable variables 
may also be highly persistent, implying that earnings elasticity might not decline 
geometrically, as commonly thought. 
In our view, looking for the same evidence in different cities or nations and 
shedding light on the underlying mechanism behind socioeconomic persistence in 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable: Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Panel A: 1427 Census 
Earnings (florins) 36.2 44.8 
Real wealth (florins) 291.2 705.0 
Age (years) 45.92 16.46 
Female (share) 0.153 0.360 
Lawyer (share) 0.012 0.090 
Banker (share) 0.009 0.072 
Medical doctor or pharmacist (share) 0.039 0.141 
Goldsmith (share) 0.009 0.068 
Panel B: 2000s data 
Earnings (euros) 24,234 4,929 
Real wealth (euros) 160,729 70,961 
Age (years) 58.39 3.03 
Female (share) 0.521 0.050 
Lawyer (share) 0.006 0.080 
Banker (share) 0.001 0.033 
Medical doctor or pharmacist (share) 0.010 0.101 
Goldsmith (share) 0.002 0.044 
Source: In Panel A, data are taken from the 1427 Census. In Panel B, data on earnings, real wealth, gender 
and age are taken from the Florence statistical office (fiscal year 2011); data on professions are obtained 
combining information taken from the Italian Internal Revenue Service (surnames of the taxpayers for the 
province of Florence in 2005) and data from the registry of the professional orders for lawyers 
(http://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/site/home.html), and for medical doctors and pharmacists 
(http://www.ordine-medici-firenze.it and http://www.ordinefarmacisti.fi.it, respectively), data from the 







Table 2. Persistence in families’ socioeconomic status  
 
 
Table 3. Earnings mobility: baseline 






Log of ancestors’ earnings 0.039** 0.040** 0.045** 
Standardized beta coefficient 0.064 0.052 0.058 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) 
Rank-rank coefficient 0.058** 0.061** 0.056** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
Female  NO YES YES 
Age and age squared NO NO YES 
Observations 806 806 806 
R-squared 0.007 0.025 0.048 
















5 top earners in 2011: 
A 146,489 Member of shoemakers' guild 97% 85% 
B 94,159 Member of wool guild 67% 73% 
C 77,647 Member of silk guild 93% 86% 
D 73,185 Messer (lawyer) 93% 85% 
E 64,228 Brick layer, sculptor, stone worker 54% 53% 
5 bottom earners in 2011: 
V 9,702 Worker in combing, carding and sorting wool 53% 45% 
W 9,486 Worker in combing, carding and sorting wool 41% 49% 
X 9,281 Sewer of wool cloth 39% 19% 
Y 7,398 Medical doctor 84% 38% 
Z 5,945 Member of shoemakers' guild 55% 46% 
Source: Tax records from the 1427 Census of Florence and from the Florence statistical office (fiscal year 2011); surnames are not 
reported for privacy reasons. 
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Table 4. Real wealth mobility: baseline 
Dependent variable: Log of wealth Log of wealth Log of wealth 
Log of ancestors’ wealth 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.018** 
Standardized beta coefficient 0.103 0.102 0.069 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Rank-rank coefficient 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.073** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Female  NO YES YES 
Age and age squared NO NO YES 
Observations 679 679 679 
R-squared 0.018 0.020 0.110 




Table 5. Earnings mobility: transition matrix 
Origin ↓ / Destination→ Lower 
class 
Middle class Upper 
class 
Lower class  32.8 36.4 30.8 
Middle class 43.0 29.1 27.9 




Table 6. Real wealth mobility: transition matrix  
Origin ↓ / Destination→ Lower 
class 
Middle class Upper 
class 
Lower class  41.6 29.8 28.6 
Middle class 31.6 34.3 34.1 







Table 7. Earnings and real wealth mobility: robustness 
Dependent variable: Log of earnings Log of wealth 
Log of ancestors’ earnings/wealth 0.065* 0.061** 0.023** 0.016** 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.010) (0.008) 






Observations 806 790 679 667 
R-squared 0.068 0.048 0.085 0.101 
In column 1, earnings are corrected using the parameters estimated by Marino and Zizza (2011); in column 3, we use real estate incomes instead 
of real wealth imputed through the SHIW; columns 2 and 4 refer to the exclusion of the top and bottom percentile of both the dependent and 
independent variables. Controls include a dummy for female and age and age squared. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1,000 




Table 8. Mobility for rare and Florence-specific surnames 








Log of ancestors’ earnings/wealth 0.076** 0.019**   
 (0.034) (0.009)   
× Less typical Florentine surnames   0.021 0.014 
   (0.036) (0.010) 
× More typical Florentine surnames   0.053* 0.020* 
   (0.027) (0.011) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Specification More weight to  
rare surnames in 1427 
Differences by low- high-
Florence-specific surnames 
Observations 806 679 806 679 
R-squared 0.061 0.119 0.049 0.110 
More (less) typical Florentine surnames are those for which the ratio between the surname share in Florence and the corresponding figure at the 
national level is above (below) the median. Controls include a dummy for female and age and age squared. Bootstrapped standard errors in 












Log of ancestors’ earnings 3.465 3.406 0.059** (0.026) 
Log of ancestors’ wealth 4.628 4.504 0.124     (0.115) 
Surviving families refer to surnames that are present both in 1427 Census and in 2011 tax records; missing 
families are surnames existing in 1427 Census but not in 2011 tax records; standard errors in parenthesis; *** 




Table 10. Heckman corrected estimates 
Dependent variable: Log of earnings Log of wealth 
Log of ancestors’ earnings/wealth 0.047* 0.025*** 
 (0.027) (0.009) 
Controls YES YES 
Inverse Mills’ ratio 0.008 0.226* 
 (0.042) (0.130) 
Observations 806 679 
 Probability of surviving 
Size of the family in 1427 0.008*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 1,895 1,895 
Controls include a dummy for female and age and age squared. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1,000 




Table 11. Probability to belong to a given profession 
Dependent variable: Lawyer Banker Doctor or 
pharmacist 
Goldsmith 
Share of ancestors in the same profession 0.004*** 0.001** 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Observations 133,193 133,193 133,193 133,193 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 



























































Figure 3. Population and GDP per capita over the long run 
Population (a) 
(thousands of inhabitants) 
 
GDP per capita (b) 
(1427=1) 
 
Figures for population refer to the city of Florence (authors’ elaborations on data drawn from 
http://www.paolomalanima.it/ and Census data from 1861 on); figures for GDP per capita refer to Florence or the Italian 




Figure 4. Earnings mobility with randomly assigned surnames 
 
Distribution of estimated earnings elasticity randomly matching ancestors’ and descendants’ earnings; 
dashed lines represent 95° and 99° percentile, red line represents the earnings elasticity properly 



























Figure 5. Wealth mobility with randomly assigned surnames 
 
Distribution of estimated wealth elasticity randomly matching ancestors’ and descendants’ wealth; 
dashed lines represent 95° and 99° percentile, red line represents the wealth elasticity properly 




Figure 6. Earnings and real wealth distribution by survival rate 
Earnings (a) 
 
Real wealth (b) 
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Figure 7. Income persistence in Florence: 1427 vs. 2005 
 
Histograms represent the intergenerational income elasticity obtained as projections of the 
pseudo-ICS measure by Güell et al. (2015b); figures for Florence in the 1427 are based on authors’ 
elaborations on data drawn from 1427 Census of Florence; figures for Florence in the mid-2000s 









Figures for 1427 are drawn from 1427 Census of Florence; figures for 2005 are drawn from sectoral studies (Studi di settore) by the 
Ministry of Economics and Finance for lawyers, doctors, pharmacists and goldsmiths and from Ciapanna et al. (2015) for bankers. 
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